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ABSTRACT
Federated learning (FL) is an emerging paradigm that en-
ables multiple organizations to jointly train a model without
revealing their private data to each other. This paper studies
vertical federated learning, which tackles the scenarios where
(i) collaborating organizations own data of the same set of
users but with disjoint features, and (ii) only one organiza-
tion holds the labels. We propose Pivot, a novel solution for
privacy preserving vertical decision tree training and predic-
tion, ensuring that no intermediate information is disclosed
other than those the clients have agreed to release (i.e., the
final tree model and the prediction output). Pivot does
not rely on any trusted third party and provides protection
against a semi-honest adversary that may compromise m−1
out of m clients. We further identify two privacy leakages
when the trained decision tree model is released in plain-
text and propose an enhanced protocol to mitigate them.
The proposed solution can also be extended to tree ensem-
ble models, e.g., random forest (RF) and gradient boosting
decision tree (GBDT) by treating single decision trees as
building blocks. Theoretical and experimental analysis sug-
gest that Pivot is efficient for the privacy achieved.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing interest in exploiting data from
distributed databases of multiple organizations, for provid-
ing better customer service and acquisition. Federated learn-
ing (FL) [52, 53] (or collaborative learning [43]) is an emerg-
ing paradigm for machine learning that enables multiple
data owners (i.e., clients) to jointly train a model without
revealing their private data to each other. The basic idea
of FL is to iteratively let each client (i) perform some local
computations on her data to derive certain intermediate re-
sults, and then (ii) exchange these results with other clients
in a secure manner to advance the training process, until a
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Figure 1: Example of vertical federated learning
final model is obtained. The advantage of FL is that it helps
each client protect her data assets, so as to abide by privacy
regulations (e.g., GDPR [3] and CCPA [1]) or to maintain a
competitive advantage from proprietary data.
Existing work on FL has mainly focused on the horizon-
tal setting [9, 52, 53, 81, 66, 60, 8, 59, 55], which assumes
that each client’s data have the same schema, but no tuple
is shared by multiple clients. In practice, however, there is
often a need for vertical federated learning, where all clients
hold the same set of records, while each client only has a dis-
joint subset of features. For example, Figure 1 illustrates a
digital banking scenario, where a bank and a Fintech com-
pany aim to jointly build a machine learning model that
evaluates credit card applications. The bank has some par-
tial information about the users (e.g., account balances),
while the Fintech company has some other information (e.g.,
the users’ online transactions). In this scenario, vertical FL
could enable the bank to derive a more accurate model, while
the Fintech company could benefit from a pay-per-use model
[73] for its contribution to the training and prediction.
To our knowledge, there exist only a few solutions [71, 44,
67, 68, 69, 21, 50, 60] for privacy preserving vertical FL.
These solutions, however, are insufficient in terms of either
efficiency or data privacy. In particular, [71, 44] assume that
the labels in the training data could be shared with all par-
ticipating clients in plaintext, whereas in practice, the labels
often exist in one client’s data only and could not be revealed
to other clients without violating privacy. For instance, in
the scenario illustrated in Figure 1, the training data could
be a set of historical credit card applications, and each label
would be a ground truth that indicates whether the applica-
tion should have been approved. In this case, the labels are
only available to the bank and could not be directly shared
with the Fintech company. As a consequence, the solutions
in [71, 44] are inapplicable. Meanwhile, [67, 68, 69, 21, 50]
assume that some intermediate results during the execution
could be revealed in plaintext; nevertheless, such interme-
diate results could be exploited by an adversarial client to
infer the sensitive information in other clients’ data. The so-
lution in [60], on the other hand, relies on secure hardware
[51] for privacy protection, but such secure hardware may
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not be trusted by all parties [81] and could be vulnerable
to side channel attacks [76]. The method in [57] utilizes se-
cure multiparty computation (MPC) [78], but assumes that
each client’s data could be outsourced to a number of non-
colluding servers. This assumption is rather strong, as it is
often challenging in practice to ensure that those servers do
not collude and to convince all clients about it.
To address the above issues, we propose Pivot, a novel
and efficient solution for vertical FL that does not rely on
any trusted third party and provides protection against a
semi-honest adversary that may compromise m − 1 out of
m clients. Pivot is a part of our Falcon1 (federated learn-
ing with privacy protection) system, and it ensures that no
intermediate information is disclosed during the training or
prediction process. Specifically, Pivot is designed for train-
ing decision tree (DT) models, which are well adopted for
financial risk management [21, 50], healthcare analytics [6],
and fraud detection [16] due to their good interpretability.
The core of Pivot is a hybrid framework that utilizes both
threshold partially homomorphic encryption (TPHE) and
MPC, which are two cryptographic techniques that comple-
ment each other especially in the vertical FL setting: TPHE
is relatively efficient in terms of communication cost but
can only support a restrictive set of computations, whereas
MPC could support an arbitrary computation but incurs
expensive communication overheads. Pivot employs TPHE
as much as possible to facilitate clients’ local computation,
and only invokes MPC in places where TPHE is inadequate
in terms of functionality. This leads to a solution that is not
only secure but also highly efficient for vertical tree mod-
els, as demonstrated in Section 8. Specifically, we make the
following contributions:● We propose a basic protocol of Pivot that supports the
training of both classification trees and regression trees,
as well as distributed prediction using the tree models
obtained. This basic protocol guarantees that each client
only learns the final tree model but nothing else. To our
knowledge, Pivot is the first vertical FL solution that
achieves such a guarantee.● We enhance the basic protocol of Pivot to handle a more
stringent case where parts of the final tree model need to
be concealed for better privacy protection. In addition,
we propose extensions of Pivot for training several en-
semble tree-based models, including random forest (RF)
and gradient boosting decision trees (GBDT).● We implement DT, RF, and GBDT models based on
Pivot and conduct extensive evaluations on both real
and synthetic datasets. The results demonstrate that
Pivot offers accuracy comparable to non-private algo-
rithms and provides high efficiency. The basic and en-
hanced protocols of Pivot achieve up to 37.5x and 4.5x
speedup (w.r.t. training time) over an MPC baseline.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Partially Homomorphic Encryption
A partially homomorphic encryption (PHE) scheme is a
probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme for restricted
computation over the ciphertexts. In this paper, we uti-
lize the Paillier cryptosystem [61], which consists of three
algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec):
1https://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~dbsystem/fintech/
project/falcon/
● The key generation algorithm (sk, pk) = Gen(keysize)
which returns secret key sk and public key pk, given a
security parameter keysize.● The encryption algorithm c = Enc(x, pk), which maps a
plaintext x to a ciphertext c using pk.● The decryption algorithm x = Dec(c, sk), which reverses
the encryption by sk and outputs the plaintext x.
Interested readers are referred to [27] for the exact construc-
tion of Enc and Dec. For simplicity, we omit the public key
pk in the Enc algorithm and write Enc(x) as [x] in the rest
of the paper. Let x1, x2 denote two plaintexts. We utilize
the following properties of PHE:
Homomorphic addition: given two ciphertexts [x1], [x2],
the ciphertext of the sum x1 + x2 can be obtained by multi-
plying the ciphertexts, i.e.,[x1]⊕ [x2] ∶ [x1] ⋅ [x2] = [x1 + x2] (1)
Homomorphic multiplication: given a plaintext x1 and
a ciphertext [x2], the ciphertext of the product x1x2 can be
obtained by raising [x2] to the power x1:
x1 ⊗ [x2] ∶ [x2]x1 = [x1x2] (2)
Homomorphic dot product: given a ciphertext vector[v] = ([v1],⋯, [vm])T and a plaintext vector x = (x1,⋯, xm),
the ciphertext of the dot product v ⋅x can be obtained by:
x⊙ [v] ∶ (x1 ⊗ [v1])⊕⋯⊕ (xm ⊗ [vm])= [x1v1 +⋯ + xmvm] (3)= [x ⋅ v]
We utilize a threshold variant of the PHE scheme (i.e.,
TPHE) with the following additional properties. First, the
public key pk is known to everyone, while each client only
holds a partial secret key. Second, the decryption of a ci-
phertext requires inputs from a certain number of clients. In
this paper, we use a full threshold structure, which requires
all clients to participate in order to decrypt a ciphertext.
2.2 Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows participants
to compute a function over their inputs while keeping the
inputs private. In this paper, we utilize the additive se-
cret sharing scheme SPDZ [28] for MPC. We refer to a
value a ∈ Zq that is additively shared among clients as a
secretly shared value, and denote it as ⟨a⟩ = (⟨a⟩1,⋯, ⟨a⟩m),
where ⟨a⟩i is a random share of ⟨a⟩ hold by client i. To
reconstruct a secretly shared value ⟨a⟩, i.e., Rec(⟨a⟩), every
client can send its own share to a specific client who com-
putes a = (∑mi=1 ⟨a⟩i) mod q. Given secretly shared values,
we have the following secure computation primitives. For
ease of exposition, we omit the modular operation in the
following formulations.
Secure addition: given two secretly shared values ⟨a⟩ and⟨b⟩, the secretly shared sum c = a + b can be obtained by
having client i non-interactively compute ⟨c⟩i = ⟨a⟩i + ⟨b⟩i.
Then ⟨c⟩i is a share of ⟨c⟩ owned by client i.
Secure multiplication: given two secretly shared values⟨a⟩ and ⟨b⟩, the secretly shared multiplication c = a ⋅b can be
obtained using Beaver’s pre-computed multiplication triplet
technique [7]. Assuming that the clients have already shared⟨u⟩, ⟨v⟩, ⟨z⟩ where u, v are random values in Zq and z = u ⋅ v
mod q, then client i locally computes ⟨e⟩i = ⟨a⟩i − ⟨u⟩i and
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Algorithm 1: CART(F,Y,D)
Input: F : feature set, Y : label set, D: sample set
Output: T : decision tree
1 if prune conditions satisfied then
2 classification: return leaf node with majority class
3 regression: return leaf node with mean label value
4 else
5 determine the best split feature j and value s
6 split D into 2 partitions Dl,Dr
7 return a tree with feature a that has two edges, call
CART(F − j, Y,Dl) and CART(F − j, Y,Dr)
⟨f⟩i = ⟨b⟩i−⟨v⟩i, and the clients run Rec(⟨e⟩) and Rec(⟨f⟩).
Finally, every client i computes ⟨c⟩i = −i ⋅ e ⋅ f + f ⋅ ⟨a⟩i + e ⋅⟨b⟩i + ⟨z⟩i. Then ⟨c⟩i is a share of ⟨c⟩ owned by client i.
Secure comparison: given two shared values ⟨a⟩ and ⟨b⟩,
the secure comparison operation (e.g., ⟨a⟩ > ⟨b⟩) returns a
secretly shared ⟨0⟩ or ⟨1⟩. The basic idea is to first truncate
the two values by 2k, then execute ⟨a⟩ − ⟨b⟩, and finally
output the secretly shared sign bit after dividing by 2k−1.
We refer the interested readers to [17, 18] for details.
Based on the above primitives, other primitives including
secure division and secure exponential can be approximated,
which are also supported in SPDZ [18, 28, 5]. In this paper,
we use these secure computations in SPDZ as building blocks
by default for the calculation concerning secretly shared val-
ues, which means that the outputs are also secretly shared
values unless they are reconstructed. The secret sharing
based MPC has two phases: an offline phase that is indepen-
dent of the function and generates pre-computed Beaver’s
triplets, and an online phase that computes the designated
function using these triplets.
2.3 Tree-based Models
In this paper, we consider the classification and regression
trees (CART) algorithm [13] with binary structure, while
we note that other variants (e.g., ID3 [64], C4.5 [65]) can
be easily generalized. We assume there is a training dataset
D with n data points {x1,⋯,xn} each containing d features
and the corresponding output label set Y = {y1,⋯, yn}.
Algorithm 1 describes the CART algorithm, which builds
a tree recursively. For each tree node, it first decides whether
some pruning conditions are satisfied, e.g., feature set is
empty, tree reaches the maximum depth, the number of
samples is less than a threshold. If any condition is sat-
isfied, then it returns a leaf node with the class of majority
samples for classification or the mean label value for regres-
sion. Otherwise, it determines the best split to construct
two sub-trees that are built recursively. In order to find the
best split feature and split threshold, CART uses Gini impu-
rity [13] as a metric in classification. Let c be the number of
classes and K = {1,⋯, c} be the class set. Let D be sample
set on a given node, the Gini impurity is:
IG(D) = 1 −∑k∈K(pk)2 (4)
where pk is the fraction of samples in D labeled with class k.
Let F be the set of available features, given any split feature
j ∈ F and split value τ ∈ Domain(j), the sample set D can
be split into two partitions Dl and Dr. Then, the impurity
gain of this split is as follows:
gain = IG(D) − (wl ⋅ IG(Dl) +wr ⋅ IG(Dr))= wl∑k∈K(pl,k)2 +wr∑k∈K(pr,k)2 −∑k∈K(pk)2 (5)
where wl = ∣Dl∣/∣D∣ and wr = ∣Dr ∣/∣D∣, and pl,k (resp. pr,k)
is the fraction of samples in Dl (resp. Dr) that are labeled
with class k ∈ K. The split with the maximum impurity
gain is considered the best split of the node. For regression,
CART uses the label variance as a metric. Let Y be the set
of labels of D, then the label variance is:
IV (D) = E(Y 2) − (E(Y ))2 = 1
n
n∑
i=1 y
2
i − ( 1
n
n∑
i=1 yi)2 (6)
Similar to Eqn (5), the best split is determined by maxi-
mizing the variance gain. With CART, ensemble models
can be trained to obtain better predictive performance, such
as random forest (RF) [12], gradient boosting decision tree
(GBDT) [35, 36], XGBoost [20], etc.
3. SOLUTION OVERVIEW
3.1 System Model
We consider a set of m distributed clients (or data owners){u1,⋯, um} who want to train a decision tree model by con-
solidating their respective dataset {D1,⋯,Dm}. Each row in
the datasets corresponds to a data sample, and each column
corresponds to a feature. Let n be the number of samples
and di be the number of features in Di, where i ∈ {1,⋯,m}.
We denote Di = {xit}nt=1 where xit represents the t-th sam-
ple of Di. Let Y = {yt}nt=1 be the set of sample labels. Table
1 summarizes the frequently used notations.
Pivot focuses on the vertical federated learning scenario
[77], where the datasets {D1,⋯,Dm} share the same sample
ids while with different features. In particular, we assume
that the clients have determined and aligned their common
samples using private set intersection techniques [54, 62, 19,
63] without revealing any information about samples not in
the intersection. In addition, we assume that the label set
Y is held by only one client (i.e., super client) and cannot
be directly shared with other clients.
3.2 Threat Model
We consider the semi-honest model [57, 75, 74, 23, 22,
38] where every client follows the protocol exactly as speci-
fied, but may try to infer other clients’ private information
based on the messages received. Like any other client, no
additional trust is assumed of the super client. We assume
that an adversary A can corrupt up to m−1 clients and the
adversary’s corruption strategy is static, such that the set of
corrupted clients is fixed before the protocol execution and
remains unchanged during the execution.
3.3 Problem Formulation
To protect the private data of honest clients, we require
that an adversary learns nothing more than the data of the
clients he has corrupted and the final output. Similar to
previous work [57, 81, 23], we formalize our problem under
the ideal/real paradigm. Let F be an ideal functionality
such that the clients send their data to a trusted third party
for computation and receive the final output from that party.
Let pi be a real world protocol executed by the clients. We
say a real protocol pi behaviors indistinguishably as the ideal
functionality F if the following formal definition is satisfied.
Definition 1. ([15, 25, 57]). A protocol pi securely realizes
an ideal functionality F if for every adversary A attacking
the real interaction, there exists a simulator S attacking
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Table 1: Summary of notations
Notation Description
m number of clients
n number of samples in the training dataset
d number of total features
Di training dataset hold by client i
Y label set of training dataset
di number of features in Di
b maximum split number for any feature
h maximum tree depth
pk, sk public key and secret key pair[α] encrypted mask vector for a tree node
the ideal interaction, such that for all environments Z, the
following quantity is negligible (in λ):∣Pr[real(Z,A, pi, λ) = 1] −Pr[ideal(Z,S,F , λ) = 1]∣.◻
In this paper, we identify two ideal functionalities FDTT andFDTP for the model training and model prediction, respec-
tively. In FDTT, the input is every client’s dataset while the
output is the trained model that all clients have agreed to
release. In FDTP, the input is the released model and a sam-
ple while the output is the predicted label of that sample.
The output of FDTT is part of the input of FDTP. Specifi-
cally, in our basic protocol (Section 4), we assume that the
output of FDTT is the plaintext tree model, including the
split feature and the split threshold on each internal node,
and the label for prediction on each leaf node. While in our
enhanced protocol (Section 5), the released plaintext infor-
mation is assumed to include only the split feature on each
internal node, whereas the split threshold and the leaf label
are concealed for better privacy protection.
3.4 Protocol Overview
We now provide the protocol overview of Pivot. The pro-
tocols are composed of three stages: initialization, model
training, and model prediction.
Initialization stage. In this stage, the m clients agree to
run a designated algorithm (i.e., the decision tree model)
over their joint data and release the pre-defined information
(e.g., the trained model) among themselves. The clients
collaboratively determine and align the joint samples. The
clients also build consensus on some hyper-parameters, such
as security parameters (e.g., key size), pruning thresholds,
and so on. The m clients jointly generate the keys of thresh-
old homomorphic encryption and every client ui receives the
public key pk and a partial secret key ski.
Model training stage. The m clients build the designated
tree model iteratively. In each iteration, the super client
first broadcasts some encrypted information to facilitate the
other clients to compute encrypted necessary statistics at
local. After that, the clients jointly convert those statistics
into MPC-compatible inputs, i.e., secretly shared values, to
determine the best split of the current tree node using se-
cure computations. Finally, the secretly shared best split is
revealed (in the Pivot basic protocol) or is converted back
into an encrypted form (in the Pivot enhanced protocol), for
clients to update the model. Throughout the whole process,
no intermediate information is disclosed to any client.
Model prediction stage. After model training, the clients
obtain a tree model. In the basic protocol of Pivot (Sec-
tion 4), the whole tree is released in plaintext. In the Pivot
enhanced protocol (Section 5), the split threshold on each
internal node and the prediction label on each leaf node are
concealed from all clients, in secretly shared form. Given
an input sample with distributed feature values, the clients
can jointly produce a prediction. Pivot guarantees that no
information except for the predicted label is revealed during
the prediction process.
4. BASIC PROTOCOL
In this section, we present our basic protocol of Pivot.
The output of the model training stage is assumed to be
the whole plaintext tree model. Note that prior work [71,
44, 67, 68, 69, 21, 50] is not applicable to our problem since
they simplify the problem by revealing either the training
labels or intermediate results in plaintext, which discloses
too much information regarding the client’s private data.
To satisfy Definition 1 for vertical tree training, a straight-
forward solution is to directly use the MPC framework. For
example, the clients can apply the additive secret sharing
scheme (see Section 2.2) to convert private datasets and la-
bels into secretly shared data, and train the model by secure
computations. However, this solution incurs high communi-
cation complexity because it involves O(nd) secretly shared
values and most secure computations are communication in-
tensive. On the other hand, while TPHE could enable each
client to compute encrypted split statistics at local by pro-
viding the super client’s encrypted label information, it does
not support some operations (e.g., comparison), which are
needed in best split determination. Based on these obser-
vations and inspired by [81], we design our basic protocol
using a hybrid framework of TPHE and MPC for vertical
tree training. The basic idea is that each client executes as
many local computations (e.g., computing split statistics) as
possible with the help of TPHE and uses MPC only when
TPHE is insufficient (e.g., deciding the best split). As a
consequence, most computations are executed at local and
the secretly shared values involved in MPC are reduced to
O(db), where b denotes the maximum number of split values
for any feature and db is the number of total splits.
Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 present our training protocol
for classification tree and regression tree, respectively. Sec-
tion 4.3 proposes our tree model prediction method. The
security analysis is provided in Section 4.4.
4.1 Classification Tree Training
In our training protocol, the clients use an mask vector
of size n to indicate which samples are available on a tree
node, but keep the vector in an encrypted form to avoid
disclosing the sample set. Specifically, let α = (α1,⋯, αn)
be an indicator vector for a tree node. Then, for any i ∈{1,⋯, n}, αi = 1 indicates that the i-th sample is available on
the node, and αi = 0 otherwise. We use [α] = ([α1],⋯, [αn])
to denote the encrypted version of α, where [⋅] represents
homomorphic encrypted values (see Section 2.1).
Before the training starts, each client initializes a decision
tree with only a root node, and associates the root node
with an encrypted indicator vector [α] where all elements
are [1] (since all samples are available on the root node).
Then, the clients work together to recursively split the root
node. In what follows, we will use an example to illustrate
how our protocol decides the best split for a given tree node
based on Gini impurity.
Consider the example in Figure 2, where we have three
clients u1, u2, and u3. Among them, u1 is the super client,
4
(super client)
[6%] = ([0], [1], [0], [0], [1])
Consider a split value 15000
on deposit:*) = (1, 1, 0, 1, 0)[3),&] = *) ⊙ 6& = [1][3),%] = *) ⊙ 6% = [1]
Compute by MPC:.'(/)) = 0.5
7 = ( 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , [1])
[6&] = ([1], [0], [1], [0], [0])
compute Gini
impurity by MPC
age
30
20
45
35
55
income label
2500 Class 1
1500 Class 2
3500 Class 1
5000 Class 1
2000 Class 2
deposit
10000
5000
30000
12000
25000
!2!3
!4
Figure 2: Classification tree training example
and she owns the labels with two classes, 1 and 2. There
are five training samples with three features (i.e., income,
age, and deposit), and each client holds one feature. Sup-
pose that the clients are to split a tree node whose encrypted
mask vector is [α] = ([1], [1], [1], [0], [1]), i.e., Samples 1, 2,
3, and 5 are on the node. Then, u1 computes an encrypted
indicator vector for each class, based on [α] and her local
labels. For example, for Class 1, u1 derives an temporary
indicator vector (1,0,1,1,0), which indicates that Samples
1, 3, and 4 belong to Class 1. Next, u1 uses the indicator
vector to perform an element-wise homomorphic multiplica-
tion with [α], which results in an encrypted indicator vec-
tor [γ1] = ([1], [0], [1], [0], [0]). This vector indicates that
Samples 1 and 3 are on the node to be split, and they be-
long to Class 1. Similarly, u1 also generates an encrypted
indicator vector [γ2] for Class 2. After that, u1 broadcasts[γ1] and [γ2] to all clients.
After receiving [γ1] and [γ2], each client combines them
with her local training data to compute several statistics
that are required to choose the best split of the current node.
In particular, to evaluate the quality of a split based on Gini
impurity (see Section 2.3), each client needs to examine the
two child nodes that would result from the split, and then
compute the following statistics for each child node: (i) the
total number of samples that belong to the child node, and
(ii) the number of samples among them that are associated
with label class k, for each k ∈K.
For example, suppose that u3 considers a split that di-
vides the current node based on whether the deposit values
are larger than 15000. Then, u3 first examines her local
samples, and divide them into two partitions. The first par-
tition (referred to as the left partition) consists of Samples 1,
2, and 4, i.e., the local samples whose deposit values are no
more than 15000. Meanwhile, the second partition (referred
to as the right partition) contains Samples 3 and 5. Accord-
ingly, for the left (resp. right) partition, u3 constructs an
indicator vector vl = (1,1,0,1,0) (resp. vr = (0,0,1,0,1)) to
specify the samples that it contains. After that, u3 performs
a homomorphic dot product between vl and [γ1] to obtain
an encrypted number [gl,1]. Observe that gl,1 equals the ex-
act number of Class 1 samples that belong to the left child
node of the split. Similarly, u3 uses vl and [γ2] to generate[gl,2], an encrypted version of the number of Class 2 samples
that belong to the left child node. Using the same approach,
u3 also computes the encrypted numbers of Classes 1 and
2 samples associated with the right child node. Further,
u3 derives an encrypted total number of samples in the left
(resp. right) child node, using a homomorphic dot product
between vl and [α] (resp. vr and [α]).
Algorithm 2: Conversion to secretly shared value
Input: [x]: ciphertext, Zq : secret sharing scheme space
pk: the public key, {ski}mi=1: partial secret keys
Output: ⟨x⟩ = (⟨x⟩1,⋯, ⟨x⟩m): secretly shared x
1 for i ∈ [1,m] do
2 [ri]← ui randomly chooses ri ∈ Zq and encrypts it
3 ui sends [ri] to u1
4 u1 computes [e] = [x]⊕ [r1]⊕⋯⊕ [rm]
5 e← clients jointly decrypt [e]
6 u1 sets ⟨x⟩1 = e − r1 mod q
7 for i ∈ [2,m] do
8 ui sets ⟨x⟩i = −ri mod q
Suppose that each client computes the encrypted numbers
associated with each possible split of the current node, us-
ing the approach illustrated for u3 above. Then, they can
convert them into MPC-compatible inputs, and then invoke
an MPC protocol to securely identify the best split of the
current node. We will elaborate the details shortly.
In general, the clients split each node in three steps: local
computation, MPC computation, and model update. In the
following, we discuss the details of each step.
Local computation. Suppose that the clients are to split
a node that is associated with an encrypted mask vector[α] = ([α1],⋯, [αn]), indicating the available samples on
the node. First, the super client constructs, for each class la-
bel k ∈K, an auxiliary indicator vector βk = (βk,1,⋯, βk,n),
such that βk,t = 1 if Sample t’s label is k, and βk,t = 0 other-
wise. After that, the super client performs an element-wise
homomorphic multiplication between βk and [α], obtaining
an encrypted indicator vector [γk]. Then, the super client
broadcasts [L] = ⋃k∈K{[γk]} to the other clients.
Upon receiving [L], each client ui uses it along with her
local data to derive several statistics for identifying the tree
node’s best split, as previously illustrated in our example. In
particular, let Fi be the set of features that ui has, and Sij
be the set of split values for a feature j ∈ Fi. Then, for any
split value τ ∈ Sij , ui first constructs two size-n indicator
vectors vl and vr, such that (i) the t-th element in vl equals
1 if Sample t’s feature j is no more than τ , and 0 otherwise,
and (ii) vr complements vl. Consider the two possible child
nodes induced by the split value τ . For each class k ∈K, let
gl,k (resp. gr,k) be the number of samples labeled with class k
that belong to the left (resp. right) child node. ui computes
the encrypted versions of gl,k and gr,k using homomorphic
dot products (see Section 2.1) as follows:[gl,k] = vl ⊙ [γk], [gr,k] = vr ⊙ [γk]. (7)
Let nl (resp. nr) be the number of samples in the left (resp.
right) child node. ui computes [nl] = vl ⊙ [α] and [nr] =
vr⊙[α]. In total, for each split value τ , ui generates 2⋅∣K ∣+2
encrypted numbers, where ∣K ∣ = c is the number of classes.
MPC computation. After the clients generate the en-
crypted statistics mentioned above (i.e., [gl,k], [gr,k], [nl],[nr]), they execute an MPC protocol to identify the best
split of the current node. Towards this end, the clients first
invoke Algorithm 2 to convert each encrypted number [x]
into a set of secret shares {⟨x⟩i}mi=1, where ⟨x⟩i is given to
ui. The general idea of Algorithm 2 is from [24, 28, 81]. We
use ⟨x⟩ to denote that the x is secretly shared among the
clients.
After the above conversion, the clients obtain secretly
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Algorithm 3: Pivot DT training (basic protocol)
Input: {Di}mi=1: local datasets, {Fi}mi=1: local features
Y : label set, [α]: encrypted mask vector
pk: the public key, {ski}mi=1: partial secret keys
Output: T : decision tree model
1 if prune conditions satisfied then
2 classification: return leaf node with majority class
3 regression: return leaf node with mean label value
4 else
5 the super client computes [L] and broadcasts it
6 for i ∈ [1,m] do
7 for j ∈ Fi do
8 for s ∈ [1, ∣Sij ∣] do
9 ui computes encrypted statistics by [L]
10 clients convert encrypted statistics to shares
11 determine the best split identifier (i∗, j∗, s∗)
12 client i∗ computes [αl], [αr] and broadcasts them
13 return a tree with j∗-th feature and s∗-th split value
that has two edges, build tree recursively
shared statistics ⟨nl⟩, ⟨nr⟩, ⟨gl,k⟩, and ⟨gr,k⟩ (for each class
k ∈ K) for each possible split τ of the current node. Us-
ing these statistics, the clients identify the best split of the
current node as follows.
Consider a split τ and the two child nodes that it induces.
To evaluate the Gini impurity of the left (resp. right) child
node, the clients need to derive, for each class k ∈ K, the
fraction pl,k (resp. pr,k) of samples on the node that are
labeled with k. Observe that
pl,k = gl,k∑k′∈K gl,k′ , pr,k = gr,k∑k′∈K gr,k′ . (8)
In addition, recall that the clients have obtained, for each
class k ∈ K, the secretly shared values ⟨gl,k⟩ and ⟨gr,k⟩.
Therefore, the clients can jointly compute ⟨pl,k⟩ and ⟨pr,k⟩
using the secure addition and secure division operators in
SPDZ (see Section 2.2), without disclosing pl,k and pr,k to
any client. With the same approach, the clients use ⟨nl⟩ and⟨nr⟩ to securely compute ⟨wl⟩ and ⟨wr⟩, where wl = nlnl+nr
and wr = nrnl+nr . Given ⟨pl,k⟩, ⟨pr,k⟩, ⟨wl⟩, and ⟨wr⟩, the
clients can then compute the impurity gain of each split τ
(see Eqn. (5)) in secretly shared form, using the secure ad-
dition and secure multiplication operators in SPDZ.
Finally, the clients jointly determine the best split using a
secure maximum computation as follows. First, each client
ui assigns an identifier (i, j, s) to the s-th split on the j-
th feature that she holds. Next, the clients initialize four
secretly shared values ⟨gainmax⟩, ⟨i∗⟩, ⟨j∗⟩, ⟨s∗⟩, all with⟨−1⟩. After that, they will compare the secretly shared
impurity gains of all splits, and securely record the iden-
tifier and impurity gain of the best split in ⟨i∗⟩, ⟨j∗⟩, ⟨s∗⟩,
and ⟨gainmax⟩, respectively. Specifically, for each split τ ,
the clients compare its impurity gain ⟨gainτ ⟩ with ⟨gainmax⟩
using secure comparison (see Section 2.2). Let ⟨sign⟩ be
the result of the secure comparison, i.e., sign = 1 if gainτ >
gainmax, and sign = 0 otherwise. Then, the clients securely
update ⟨gainmax⟩ using the secretly shared values, such that
gainmax = gainmax ⋅ (1 − sign) + gainτ ⋅ sign. The best split
identifier is updated in the same manner. After examining
all splits, the clients obtain the secretly shared best split
identifier (⟨i∗⟩, ⟨j∗⟩, ⟨s∗⟩).
Model update. Recall that in the basic protocol, the tree
model can be released in plaintext. Therefore, the clients
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Figure 3: Tree model prediction example with a sample(age = 25, income = 2500,deposit = 6000): (a) tree model:
colored circles denote internal nodes and gray circles denote
leaf nodes; (b) prediction: clients update a encrypted pre-
diction vector in a round-robin manner.
reconstruct the secretly shared identifier. Then, the i∗-th
client can retrieve the two indicator vectors vl and vr for
the s∗-th split of the j∗-th feature. After that, she executes
element-wise homomorphic multiplication on the two vec-
tors by [α], obtaining [αl] and [αr] for the two branches,
and broadcasts them to the other clients. Note that [αl]
and [αr] exactly specify the available samples on the two
child nodes, respectively. For example, in Figure 2, if the
current split of the ‘deposit’ feature is selected, u3 can com-
pute [αl] = ([1], [1], [0], [0], [0]) using vl and [α], indicat-
ing that Samples 1 and 2 are available on the left child node.
4.2 Regression Tree Training
For the regression tree, since the label is continuous, the
central part is to compute the label variance. The MPC
computation step and model update step are similar to that
of classification, thus, we only present the difference in the
local computation step.
According to the label variance formula Eqn. (6), the su-
per client can construct two auxiliary vectors β1 = (y1,⋯, yn)
and β2 = (y21 ,⋯, y2n), where the elements in β1 are the
original training labels while the elements in β2 are the
square of the original training labels. Next, she computes
element-wise homomorphic multiplication on β1 (resp. β2)
by [α], obtaining [γ1] (resp. [γ2]). Then, she broadcasts[L] = {[γ1], [γ2]} to all clients. Similarly, each client com-
putes the following encrypted statistics for any local split:[nl] = vl ⊙ [α], [gl,1] = vl ⊙ [γ1], [gl,2] = vl ⊙ [γ2] (9)
where [nl], [gl,1], [gl,2] are the encrypted number of sam-
ples, and the encrypted sum of [γ1] and [γ2] of the avail-
able samples, for the left branch. Similarly, these encrypted
statistics can be converted into secretly shared values and
the best split identifier can be decided based on Eqn. (6).
Algorithm 3 describes the privacy preserving decision tree
training protocol. Lines 1-3 check the pruning conditions
and compute the leaf label if any condition is satisfied. Note
that with the encrypted statistics, these executions can be
easily achieved by secure computations. Lines 5-13 find the
best split and build the tree recursively, where lines 5-9 are
the local computation step for computing encrypted split
statistics; line 10-11 are the MPC computation step that
converts the encrypted statistics into secretly shared values
and decides the best split identifier using MPC; and line
12 is the model update step, which computes the encrypted
indicator vectors for the child nodes given the best split.
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4.3 Tree Model Prediction
After releasing the plaintext tree model, the clients can
jointly make a prediction given a sample. In vertical FL, the
features of a sample are distributed among the clients. Fig-
ure 3a shows an example of a released model, where each in-
ternal node represents a feature with a split threshold owned
by a client, and each leaf node represents a predicted label
on that path. To predict a sample, a naive method is to let
the super client coordinate the prediction process [21]: start-
ing from the root node, the client who has the node feature
compares its value with the split threshold, and notifies su-
per client the next branch; then the prediction is forwarded
to the next node until a leaf node is reached. However, this
method discloses the prediction path, from which a client
can infer the other client’s feature value along that path.
To ensure that no additional information other than the
predicted output is leaked, we propose a distributed predic-
tion method, as shown in Algorithm 4. Let z = (z1,⋯, zt+1)
be the leaf label vector of the leaf nodes in the tree model,
where t is the number of internal nodes. Note that all clients
know z since the tree model is public in this protocol. Given
a sample, clients collaborate to update an encrypted predic-
tion vector [η] = ([1],⋯, [1]) with size t+1 in a round-robin
manner. Each element in [η] indicates if a prediction path
is possible with encrypted form.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the prediction
starts with um and ends with u1. If a prediction path is pos-
sible from the perspective of a client, then the client multi-
plies the designated element in [η] by 1 using homomorphic
multiplication, otherwise by 0. Figure 3b illustrates an ex-
ample of this method. Starting from u3, given the feature
value ‘deposit = 6000’, u3 initializes [η] and updates it to([0], [1], [1], [0], [1]), since she can eliminate the first and
fourth prediction paths after comparing her value with the
split threshold ‘deposit = 5000’. Then, u3 sends [η] to the
next client for updates. After all clients’ updates, there is
only one [1] in [η], which indicates the true prediction path.
Finally, u1 computes z⊙[η] to get the encrypted prediction
output, and decrypts it jointly with all clients.
4.4 Security Guarantees
Theorem 1. The basic protocol of Pivot securely realizes
the ideal functionalities FDTT and FDTP against a semi-
honest adversary who can statically corrupt up to m − 1 out
of m clients.
Proof Sketch. We need to show that, in the view of an
adversary A, any information learned by the protocol can
be learned directly from the input it has corrupted and the
output it receives.
For model training, the proof can be reduced to the com-
putations on one tree node because each node can be com-
puted separately given that its output is public [47, 48].
There are two cases. First, when a given node is an internal
node: (i) if the super client is corrupted, nothing is revealed
in the local computation step regarding the honest client’s
data; while the MPC conversion [24] and additive secret
sharing scheme [28] are secure, thus, the MPC computation
step is secure; finally, in the model update step, if i∗ is an
honest client, the transmitted message [α] is secure for the
threshold Paillier scheme [61] is secure. (ii) if the super client
is not corrupted, the only difference is the transmitted en-
crypted label information [L], which is also secure. Second,
Algorithm 4: Pivot DT prediction (basic protocol)
Input: T : decision tree model, {xi}mi=1: input sample
pk: the public key, {ski}mi=1: partial secret keys
Output: k¯: predicted label
1 for i ∈ [m,1] do
2 if i ==m then
3 ui initializes [η] = ([1],⋯, [1]) with size t + 1
4 if i > 1 then
5 ui updates [η] using (T , xi)
6 ui sends [η] to ui−1
7 else
8 ui updates [η] using (T , xi)
9 ui initializes label vector z = (z1,⋯, zt+1)
10 ui computes [k¯] = z ⊙ [η]
11 clients jointly decrypt [k¯] by {ski}mi=1 and return k¯
when a given node is a leaf node: (i) if the super client is
corrupted, nothing is revealed since the honest client does
not have the labels; (ii) if the super client is not corrupted,
the transmitted messages are the encrypted sample number
of each class (for classification) and the encrypted mean la-
bel (for regression), which are secure. Therefore, A learns
no additional information from the protocol execution, the
security follows.
For model prediction, the adversary A views an encrypted
prediction vector [η] updated by the honest client(s) and the
encrypted prediction output [k¯], thus, no more information
is learned (the decrypted prediction output is public) for the
threshold Paillier scheme is secure. ◻
5. ENHANCED PROTOCOL
The basic protocol guarantees that no intermediate in-
formation is disclosed. However, after obtaining the public
model, colluding clients may extract private information of
a target client’s training dataset, with the help of their own
datasets. We first present two possible privacy leakages in
Section 5.1 and then propose an enhanced protocol that mit-
igates this problem by concealing some model information
in Section 5.2. The security analysis is given in Section 5.3.
5.1 Privacy Leakages
We identify two possible privacy leakages: the training la-
bel leakage and the feature value leakage, regarding a target
client’s training dataset. The intuition behind the leakages
is that the colluding clients are able to split the sample set
based on the split information in the model and their own
datasets. We illustrate them by the following two examples
given the tree model in Figure 3.
Example 1. (Training label leakage). Assume that u2 and
u3 collude, let us see the right branch of the root node. u2
knows exactly the sample set in this branch, say Dage > 30,
as all samples are available on the root node and he can just
split his local samples based on ‘age = 30’. Then, u3 can
classify this set into two subsets given the ‘deposit=5000’
split, say Dage > 30⋀deposit ≤ 5000 and Dage > 30⋀deposit > 5000,
respectively. Consequently, according to the plaintext class
labels on the two leaf nodes, colluding clients may infer that
the samples in Dage > 30⋀deposit ≤ 5000 are with class 2 and
vise versa, with high probability.
Example 2. (Feature value leakage). Assume that u1 and
u2 collude, let us see the path of u2 → u1 → u3 (with red
arrows). Similar to Example 1, u1 and u2 can exactly know
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the training sample set on the ‘u3’ node before splitting, say
D′. In addition, recall that u1 is the super client who has
all sample labels, thus, he can easily classify D′ into two
sets by class, say D′1 and D′2, respectively. Consequently,
the colluding clients may infer that the samples in D′2 have
‘deposit ≤ 5000’ and vise versa, with high probability.
Note that these two leakages happen when the clients (ex-
cept the target client) along a path collude. Essentially,
given the model, the colluding clients (without super client)
may infer labels of some samples in the training dataset if
there is no feature belongs to the super client along a tree
path; similarly, if the super client involves in collusion, the
feature values of some samples in the training dataset of a
target client may be inferred.
5.2 Hiding Label and Split Threshold
Our observation is that these privacy leakages can be mit-
igated if the split thresholds on the internal nodes and the
leaf labels on the leaf nodes in the model are concealed from
all clients. Without such information, the colluding clients
can neither determine how to split the sample set nor what
leaf label a path owns. We now discuss how to hide these
information in the model.
For the leaf label on each leaf node, the clients can con-
vert it to an encrypted value, instead of reconstructing its
plaintext. Specifically, after obtaining the secretly shared
leaf label (e.g., ⟨k⟩) using secure computations (Lines 1-3 in
Algorithm 3), each client encrypts her own share of ⟨k⟩ and
broadcasts to all clients. Then, the encrypted leaf label can
be computed by summing up these encrypted shares using
homomorphic addition. As such, the leaf label is concealed.
For the split threshold on each internal node, the clients
hide it by two additional computations in the model update
step. Recall that in the basic protocol, the best split identi-
fier (⟨i∗⟩, ⟨j∗⟩, ⟨s∗⟩) is revealed to all clients after the MPC
computation in each iteration. In the enhanced protocol,
we assume that ⟨s∗⟩ is not revealed, thus the split threshold
can be concealed. To support the tree model update with-
out disclosing s∗ to the i∗-th client, we first use the private
information retrieval (PIR) [75, 74] technique to privately
select the split indicator vectors of s∗.
Private split selection. Let n′ = ∣Sij ∣ denote the number
of splits of the j∗-th feature of the i∗-th client. We assume
n′ is public for simplicity. Note that the clients can further
protect n′ by padding placeholders to a pre-defined thresh-
old number. Instead of revealing ⟨s∗⟩ to the i∗-th client, the
clients jointly convert ⟨s∗⟩ into an encrypted indicator vec-
tor [λ] = ([λ1],⋯, [λn′])T , such that λt = 1 when t = s∗ and
λt = 0 otherwise, where t ∈ {1,⋯, n′}. This vector is sent
to the i∗-th client for private split selection at local. Let
V n×n′ = (v1,⋯,vn′) be the split indicator matrix, where vt
is the split indicator vector of the t-th split of the j∗-th fea-
ture (see Section 4.1). The following theorem [74] suggests
that the i∗-th client can compute the encrypted indicator
vector for the s∗-th split without disclosing s∗.
Theorem 2. Given an encrypted indicator vector [λ] =([λ1],⋯, [λn′])T such that [λs∗] = [1] and [λt] = [0] for all
t ≠ s∗, and the indicator matrix V n×n′ = (v1,⋯,vn′), then[vs∗] = V ⊗[λ]. ◻
The notion ⊗ represents the homomorphic matrix multipli-
cation, which executes homomorphic dot product operations
between each row in V and [λ]. We refer the interested
readers to [74] for the details.
For simplicity, we denote the selected [vs∗] as [v]. The
encrypted split threshold can also be obtained by homomor-
phic dot product between the encrypted indicator vector [λ]
and the plaintext split value vector of the j∗-th feature.
Encrypted mask vector updating. After finding the en-
crypted split vector [v], we need to update the encrypted
mask vector [α] for protecting the sample set recursively.
This requires element-wise multiplication between [α] and[v]. Thanks to the MPC conversion algorithm, we can
compute [α] ⋅ [v] as follows [24]. For each element pair[αj] and [vj] where j ∈ [1, n], we first convert [αj] into⟨αj⟩ = (⟨αj⟩1,⋯, ⟨αj⟩m) using Algorithm 2, where ⟨αj⟩i(i ∈{1,⋯,m}) is the share hold by ui; then each client ui exe-
cutes homomorphic multiplication ⟨αj⟩i ⊗ [vj] = [⟨αj⟩i ⋅ vj]
and sends the result to the i∗-th client; finally, the i∗-th
client can sum up the results using homomorphic addition:[α′j] = [⟨αj⟩1 ⋅ vj]⊕⋯⊕ [⟨αj⟩m ⋅ vj] = [αj ⋅ vj] (10)
After updating [α], the tree can also be built recursively,
similar to the basic protocol.
Secret sharing based model prediction. The prediction
method in the basic protocol is not applicable here as the
clients cannot directly compare their feature values with the
encrypted split thresholds. Hence, the clients first convert
the encrypted split thresholds and encrypted leaf labels into
secretly shared form and make predictions on the secretly
shared model using MPC. Let ⟨z⟩ with size (t + 1) denote
the secretly shared leaf label vector, where t is the number
of internal nodes.
To make the prediction given a sample, the clients also
provide the distributed feature values in secretly shared form.
Similar to the prediction in the basic protocol, the clients
initialize a secretly shared prediction vector ⟨η⟩ with size(t + 1), indicating if a prediction path is possible. Then,
they compute this vector as follows.
The clients initialize a secretly shared marker ⟨1⟩ for the
root node. Starting from root node, the clients recursively
compute the markers of its child nodes until all leaf nodes are
reached. Then, the marker of each leaf node is assigned to
the corresponding position in ⟨η⟩, and there is only one ⟨1⟩
element in ⟨η⟩, specifying the real prediction path in a secret
manner. Specifically, each marker is computed by secure
multiplication between its parent node’s marker and a secure
comparison result (between the secretly shared feature value
and split threshold on this node). For example, in Figure 3a,
the split threshold on the root node will be ⟨30⟩ while the
feature value will be ⟨25⟩, then ⟨1⟩ is assigned to its left
child and ⟨0⟩ to its right child. The clients know nothing
about the assigned markers due to the computations are
secure. Finally, the secretly shared prediction output can
be computed easily by a dot product between ⟨z⟩ and ⟨η⟩,
using secure computations.
Discussion. A noteworthy aspect is that the clients can
also choose to hide the feature ⟨j∗⟩ by defining n′ as the
total number of splits on the i∗-th client, or even the client⟨i∗⟩ that has the best feature by defining n′ as the total
number of splits among all clients. By doing so, the leak-
ages could be further alleviated. However, the efficiency and
interpretability would be degraded greatly. In fact, there is
a trade-off between privacy and efficiency (interpretability)
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Table 2: Theoretical analysis
Pivot basic protocol Pivot enhanced protocol
Model training O(ncd¯bt)Ce +O(cdbt)(Cd +Cs) +O(dbt)Cc O(ncd¯bt)Ce +O(cdbt + nt)Cd +O(cdbt)Cs +O(dbt)Cc
– local computation O(ncd¯b)Ce O(ncd¯b)Ce
– mpc computation O(cdb)(Cd +Cs) +O(db)Cc O(cdb)(Cd +Cs) +O(db)Cc
– model update O(n)Ce O(nb)Ce +O(n)Cd
Model prediction O(mt)Ce +O(1)Cd O(t)(Cs +Cc)
for the released model. The less information the model re-
veals, the higher privacy while the lower efficiency and less
interpretability the clients obtain, and vise versa.
5.3 Security Guarantees
Theorem 3. The enhanced protocol of Pivot securely re-
alizes the ideal functionalities FDTT and FDTP against a
semi-honest adversary who can statically corrupt up to m−1
out of m clients.
Proof Sketch. For model training, the only difference from
the basic protocol is the two additional computations (pri-
vate split selection and encrypted mask vector updating) in
the model update step, which are computed using threshold
Paillier scheme and MPC conversion. Thus, the security fol-
lows. For model prediction, since the additive secret sharing
scheme is secure and the clients compute a secretly shared
marker for every possible path, the adversary learns nothing
except the final prediction output. ◻
6. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We theoretically analyze the Pivot basic protocol and Pivot
enhanced protocol in terms of computational cost for model
training and model prediction, as summarized in Table 2.
Let Ce and Cs roughly denote the costs for computations
on a homomorphic encrypted value and on a secretly shared
value, respectively. Due to that the threshold decryption
(involving decryption of each client and combination via
network communication) and secure comparison (involving
multi-round network communications among the clients) are
more time-consuming than the other computations, we con-
sider these two operations separately for better analysis, and
denote the costs of them by Cd and Cc, respectively. Let
d¯ = max({di}mi=1) be the maximum number of features any
client holds, b be the maximum number of splits any feature
has, and c be the number of classes.
Model training. With the basic protocol, the computa-
tional cost of a client in each iteration includes: (i) local
computation step: the encrypted label vectors computed by
the super client, i.e., O(nc)Ce, and the encrypted statis-
tics computed by the clients, i.e., O(ncd¯b)Ce, where d¯b is
number of local splits; (ii) MPC computation step: the
MPC conversion for encrypted statistics of total splits, i.e.,
O(cdb)Cd, and the best split determined usingO(cdb) statis-
tics, i.e., O(cdb)Cs + O(db)Cc, where db is the number of
total splits; and (iii) model update step: the update of en-
crypted mask vectors, i.e., O(n)Ce. Thus, the total cost is
O(ncd¯bt)Ce + O(cdbt)(Cd + Cs) + O(dbt)Cc, where t is the
number of internal nodes in the tree model. With the en-
hanced protocol, the only difference is the two additional
computations in the model update step: private split se-
lection on b split indicator vectors, i.e., O(nb)Ce, and en-
crypted mask vector update that mainly requires n threshold
decryption operations, i.e., O(n)Cd. Thus, the total cost is
O(ncd¯bt)Ce +O(cdbt + nt)Cd +O(cdbt)Cs +O(dbt)Cc.
Model prediction. With the basic protocol, the computa-
tional cost of prediction is updating an encrypted prediction
vector with size (t+1) in a Robin round, i.e., O(mt)Ce, the
homomorphic dot product between the encrypted predic-
tion vector and the plaintext label vector, i.e., O(t)Ce, and
the threshold decryption of the final prediction output, i.e.,
O(1)Cd. Thus, the total cost is O(mt)Ce +O(1)Cd. With
the enhanced protocol, the computational cost includes the
secure comparison of t internal nodes and the secure dot
product between the prediction vector and the label vector,
i.e., O(t)(Cs +Cc).
In summary, regarding model training, the computational
cost of the enhanced protocol is always larger than that of
the basic protocol because the two additional computations
are extra costs. Regarding model prediction, whether the
basic protocol is better depends on the number of clients m
and the relationship between ciphertext computation cost
and secure computation cost. We will experimentally eval-
uate the two protocols in Section 8.
7. EXTENSIONS TO OTHER ML MODELS
So far, Pivot supports a single tree model. Now we briefly
present how to extend the basic protocol to ensemble tree
models, including random forest (RF) [12] and gradient boost-
ing decision tree (GBDT) [35, 36] in Section 7.1 and Section
7.2, respectively. Same as the basic protocol, we assume that
all the trees can be released in plaintext. The extension to
other machine learning models is discussed in Section 7.3.
7.1 Random Forest
RF constructs a set of independent decision trees in the
training stage and outputs the class that is the mode of the
classes (for classification) or mean prediction (for regression)
of those trees in the prediction stage.
For model training, the extension from a single decision
tree is natural since each tree can be built (using Algorithm
3) and released separately. For model prediction, after ob-
taining the encrypted predicted label of each tree, the clients
can easily convert these encrypted labels into secret shares
for majority voting using secure maximum computation (for
classification) or compute the encrypted mean prediction by
homomorphic computations (for regression).
7.2 Gradient Boosting Decision Trees
GBDT uses decision trees as weak learners and improves
model quality with a boosting strategy [34]. The trees are
built sequentially where the training labels for the next tree
are the prediction losses between the ground truth labels
and the prediction outputs of previous trees.
Model training. The extension to GBDT is non-trivial,
since we need to prevent the super client from knowing the
training labels of each tree except the first tree (i.e., inter-
mediate information) while facilitating the training process.
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We first consider GBDT regression. Let W be the number
of rounds and a regression tree is built in each round. Let
Y w be the training label vector of the w-th tree. We aim
to protect Y w by keeping it in an encrypted form. After
building the w-th tree where w ∈ {1,⋯,W − 1}, the clients
jointly make predictions for all training samples to get an
encrypted estimation vector [Y¯ w]; then the clients can com-
pute the encrypted training labels [Y w+1] of the (w + 1)-th
tree given [Y w] and [Y¯ w]. Besides, note that in Section 4.2,
an encrypted label square vector [γw+12 ] is needed, which is
computed by element-wise homomorphic multiplication be-
tween βw+12 and [α]. However, βw+12 is not plaintext here
since the training labels are ciphertexts. Thus, the clients
need expensive element-wise ciphertext multiplications (see
Section 5.2) between [βw+12 ] and [α] in each iteration. To
optimize this computation, we slightly modify our basic pro-
tocol. Instead of letting the super client compute [γw+12 ] in
each iteration, we now let the client who has the best split
update [γw+12 ] along with [α] using the same split indicator
vector and broadcast them to all clients. In this way, the
clients only need to compute [γw+12 ] using [βw+12 ] and [α]
once at the beginning of each round, which reduces the cost.
For GBDT classification, we use the one-vs-the-rest tech-
nique by combining a set of binary classifiers. Essentially,
the clients need to build a GBDT regression forest for each
class, resulting in W ∗ c regression trees in total (c is the
number of classes). After each round in the training stage,
the clients obtain c trees; and for each training sample, the
clients make a prediction on each tree, resulting in c en-
crypted prediction outputs. Then, the clients jointly con-
vert them into secretly shared values for computing secure
softmax (which can be constructed using secure exponen-
tial, secure addition, and secure division, as mentioned in
Section 2.2), and convert them back into an encrypted form
as encrypted estimations. The rest of the computation is
the same as regression.
Model prediction. For GBDT regression, the prediction
output can be decrypted after homomorphic aggregating the
encrypted predictions of all trees. For GBDT classification,
the encrypted prediction for each class is the same as that for
regression; then the clients jointly convert these encrypted
results into secretly shared values for deciding the final pre-
diction output by secure softmax function.
7.3 Other Machine Learning Models
Though we consider tree-based models in this paper, the
proposed solution can be easily adopted in other vertical FL
models, such as logistic regression (LR), neural networks,
and so on. The rationale is that these models can often be
partitioned into the three steps described in Section 4.1. As
a result, the TPHE primitives, conversion algorithm, and
secure computation operators can be re-used.
For example, the clients can train a vertical LR model
as follows. To protect the intermediate weights of the LR
model during the training, the clients initialize an encrypted
weight vector, [θ] = ([θ1],⋯, [θm]), where [θi] corresponds
to the encrypted weights of features held by client i. In each
iteration, for a Sample t, each client i first locally aggregates
an encrypted partial sum, say [ξit], by homomorphic dot
product between [θi] and Sample t’s local features xit. Then
the clients jointly convert {[ξit]}mi=1 into secretly shared val-
ues using Algorithm 2, and securely aggregate them before
computing the secure logistic function. Meanwhile, the su-
per client also provides Sample t’s label as a secretly shared
value, such that the clients can jointly compute the secretly
shared loss of Sample t. After that, the clients convert the
loss back into the encrypted form (see Section 5.2), and each
client can update her encrypted weights [θi] using homo-
morphic properties, without knowing the loss. Besides, the
model prediction is a half component of one iteration in
training, which can be easily computed.
8. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the performance of Pivot basic protocol (Sec-
tion 4) and Pivot enhanced protocol (Section 5) on the deci-
sion tree model, as well as the ensemble extensions (Section
7). We present the accuracy evaluation in Section 8.2 and
the efficiency evaluation in Section 8.3.
We implement Pivot in C++ and employ the GMP2 li-
brary for big integer computation and the libhcs3 library
for operations of the threshold Paillier scheme. We utilize
the SPDZ 4 library for semi-honest additive secret sharing
computations. Besides, we apply the libscapi5 library to
provide network communications among clients. Since the
cryptographic primitives only support big integer computa-
tions, we convert the floating point datasets into fixed-point
integer representation.
8.1 Experimental Setup
We conduct experiments on a cluster of machines in a local
area network (LAN). Each machine is equipped with Intel
(R) Xeon (R) CPU E5-1650 v3 @ 3.50GHz×12 and 32GB of
RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. Unless noted otherwise,
the keysize of threshold Paillier scheme is 1024 bits and the
security parameter of SPDZ configuration is 128 bits.
Datasets. We evaluate the model accuracy using three real-
world datasets: credit card data (30000 samples with 25
features) [79], bank marketing data (4521 samples with 17
features) [58], and appliances energy prediction data (19735
samples with 29 features) [14]. The former two datasets are
for classification while the third dataset is for regression.
We evaluate the efficiency using synthetic datasets, which
are generated with sklearn6 library. Specifically, we vary
the number of samples (n) and the number of total features
(d) to generate datasets and then equally split these datasets
w.r.t. features intom partitions, which are held bym clients,
respectively. We denote d¯ = d/m as the number of features
each client holds. For classification tasks, the number of
classes is set to 4, and only one client holds the labels.
Baselines. For accuracy evaluation, we adopt the non-
private decision tree (NP-DT), non-private random forest
(NP-RF), and non-private gradient-boosting decision tree
(NP-GBDT) algorithms from sklearn for comparison. For
a fair comparison, we adopt the same hyper-parameters for
both our protocols and the baselines, e.g., the maximum tree
depth, the pruning conditions, the number of trees, etc.
For efficiency evaluation, to our knowledge, there is no
existing work providing the same privacy guarantee as Pivot.
Therefore, we implement a secret sharing based decision tree
2http://gmplib.org
3https://github.com/tiehuis/libhcs
4https://github.com/data61/MP-SPDZ
5https://github.com/cryptobiu/libscapi
6https://scikit-learn.org/stable/
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Table 3: Model accuracy comparison with non-private baselines
Dataset Pivot-DT NP-DT Pivot-RF NP-RF Pivot-GBDT NP-GBDT
Bank market 0.886077 0.886188 0.888619 0.890497 0.891271 0.892044
Credit card 0.821526 0.821533 0.823056 0.823667 0.825167 0.827167
Appliances energy 212.05281 211.45229 211.55175 211.32113 211.35326 210.75291
algorithm using the SPDZ library (namely, SPDZ-DT) as a
baseline. The security parameter of SPDZ-DT is also 128
bits. Besides, we also implement a non-private distributed
decision tree (NPD-DT) algorithm as another baseline to
illustrate the overhead of protecting the data privacy. In
NPD-DT, the super client broadcasts plaintext labels to all
clients, each client computes split statistics and exchanges
them in plaintext with others to decide the best split.
Metrics. For model accuracy, we measure the number of
samples that are correctly classified over the total testing
samples for classification; and the mean square error (MSE)
between the predicted labels and the ground truth labels
for regression. For efficiency, we measure the total running
time of the model training stage and the prediction running
time per sample of the model prediction stage. In all ex-
periments, we report the running time of the online phase
because SPDZ did not support the offline time benchmark
for the semi-honest additive secret sharing protocol.
8.2 Evaluation of Accuracy
In terms of accuracy, we compare the performance of the
proposed decision tree (Pivot-DT), random forest (Pivot-
RF) and gradient boosting decision tree (Pivot-GBDT) al-
gorithms with their non-private baselines on three real world
datasets. In these experiments, the keysize of threshold Pail-
lier scheme is set to 512 bits. We conduct 10 independent
trials of each experiment and report the average result.
Table 3 summarizes the comparison results. We can notice
that the Pivot algorithms achieve accuracy comparable to
the non-private baselines. There are two reasons for the
slight loss of accuracy. First, we use the fixed-point integer
to represent float values, whose precision is thus truncated.
Second, Pivot has only implemented the basic algorithms,
which are not optimized as the adopted baselines.
8.3 Evaluation for Efficiency
In terms of efficiency, we evaluate the training and pre-
diction time of Pivot with the two protocols (namely Pivot-
Basic and Pivot-Enhanced) in Section 8.3.1 and Section 8.3.2,
by varying the number of clients (m), the number of samples
(n), the number of features of each client (d¯), the maximum
number of splits (b), the maximum tree depth (h), and the
number of trees (W ) for ensemble methods.
We employ parallelism for threshold decryption of multi-
ple ciphertexts with 6 cores, which is observed to be the most
time-consuming part in Pivot. The secure computations us-
ing SPDZ are not parallelized because the current SPDZ
cannot express parallelism effectively and flexibly. These
Table 4: Parameters adopted in the evaluation
Parameter Description Range Default
m number of clients [2,10] 3
n number of samples [5K,200K] 50K
d¯ number of features [5,120] 15
b maximum splits [2,32] 8
h maximum tree depth [2,6] 4
W number of trees [2,32] −
partially parallelized versions are denoted as Pivot-Basic-PP
and Pivot-Enhanced-PP, respectively. The comparison with
the baselines is reported in Section 8.3.3. Table 4 describes
the ranges and default settings of the evaluated parameters.
8.3.1 Evaluation on Training Efficiency
Varying m. Figure 4a shows the performance for varying
m. The training time of all algorithms increases as m in-
creases because the threshold decryptions and secure com-
putations need more communication rounds. Pivot-Basic
always performs better than Pivot-Enhanced since Pivot-
Enhanced has two additional computations in the model up-
date step, where the O(n) ciphertexts multiplications dom-
inate the cost. Besides, we can see that Pivot-Enhanced-PP
that parallelizes only the threshold decryptions could reduce
the total training time by up to 2.7 times.
Varying n. Figure 4b shows the performance for varying
n. The relative comparison of the Pivot-Basic and Pivot-
Enhanced is similar to Figure 4a, except that the training
time of Pivot-Basic increases slightly when n goes up. The
reason is that, in Pivot-Basic, the cost of encrypted statis-
tics computation (proportional to O(n)) is only a small part
of the total training time; the time-consuming parts are the
MPC conversion that requires O(cdb) threshold decryptions.
The training time of Pivot-Enhanced scales linearly with n
because of the threshold decryptions for encrypted mask vec-
tor updating are proportional to O(n). For example, when
n = 200K, the training time of Pivot-Enhanced is about 12
hours while that of Pivot-Basic is only 35 minutes.
Varying d¯, b. Figure 4c-4d show the performance for vary-
ing d¯ and b, respectively. The trends of the four algorithms
in these two experiments are similar, i.e., the training time
all scales linearly with d¯ or b since the number of total splits
is O(db). In addition, the gap between Pivot-Basic and
Pivot-Enhanced is stable as d¯ or b increases. This is be-
cause that d¯ does not affect the additional costs in Pivot-
Enhanced, and b only has small impact via private split se-
lection (i.e., O(nb) ciphertext computations) which is neg-
ligible comparing to the encrypted mask vector updating
computation.
Varying h. Figure 4e shows the performance for varying
h. Since the generated synthetic datasets are sampled uni-
formly, the trained models tend to construct a full binary
tree, where the number of internal nodes is 2h − 1 given the
maximum tree depth h. Therefore, the training time of all
algorithms approximately double when h increases by one.
Varying W . Figure 4f shows the performance for varying
W in ensemble methods. RF classification is slightly slower
than RF regression as the default c is 4 in classification com-
paring to 2 in regression. GBDT regression is slightly slower
than RF regression, since additional computations are re-
quired by GBDT to protect intermediate training labels.
Besides, the training time of GBDT classification is much
longer than GBDT regression for two overheads: one is the
one-vs-the-rest strategy, which meansW∗c trees are trained;
the other is the secure softmax computation on c encrypted
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Figure 4: Effect of parameters in decision tree models
predictions for every sample in the training dataset, which
needs additional MPC conversions and secure computations.
8.3.2 Evaluation on Prediction Efficiency
Varying m. Figure 4g compares the prediction time per
sample for varying m. Results show that the prediction time
of Pivot-Enhanced is higher than Pivot-Basic, because the
cost of secure comparisons is higher than the homomorphic
computations. Besides, the prediction time of Pivot-Basic
increases faster than that of Pivot-Enhanced as m increases.
The reason is that the communication round for distributed
prediction in Pivot-Basic scales linearly with m; while in
Pivot-Enhanced, the number of secure comparisons remains
the same, the increasing of m only incurs slight overhead.
Varying h. Figure 4h compares the prediction time per
sample for varying h. When h = 2, Pivot-Enhanced takes
less prediction time because the number of internal nodes
(i.e. secure comparisons) is very small. Pivot-Basic out-
performs Pivot-Enhanced when h ≥ 3 and this advantage
increases as h increases for two reasons. Firstly, the num-
ber of internal nodes is proportional to 2h − 1. Secondly, as
described in Figure 4g, the number of clients dominates the
prediction time of Pivot-Basic; although the size of the pre-
diction vector also scales to h, its effect is insignificant since
the size is still very small, leading to stable performance.
8.3.3 Comparison with Baseline Solution
We compare the Pivot protocols with the baselines SPDZ-
DT and NPD-DT. For NPD-DT, we report the training time
for varying m and n in Figure 5a-5b, and the prediction
time per sample for varying m and h in Figure 4g-4h. In
all the evaluated NPD-DT experiments, the training time is
less than 1 minute, and the prediction time is less than 1
ms. Nevertheless, the efficiency of NPD-DT is at the cost of
data privacy. For SPDZ-DT, since it is not parallelized, we
adopt the non-parallelized versions We omit the comparison
of prediction time, because the model prediction in SPDZ-
DT is similar to that in Pivot-Enhanced. We compare with
SPDZ-DT for varying m and n.
Varying m. Figure 5a shows the comparison for varying m.
When m = 2, Pivot-Enhanced and SPDZ-DT achieve simi-
lar performance. However, the training time of SPDZ-DT
increases much faster as m increases because almost every
secure computation in SPDZ-DT requires communication
among all clients while most computations in Pivot proto-
cols can be executed locally. We can notice that Pivot-Basic
and Pivot-Enhanced can achieve up to about 19.8x and 4.5x
speedup over SPDZ-DT, respectively.
Varying n. Figure 5b shows the comparison for varying
n. Both Pivot-Enhanced and SPDZ-DT scale linearly to n
and SPDZ-DT increases more quickly than Pivot-Enhanced.
When n is small (e.g., n = 5K), the three algorithms achieve
almost the same performance. While when n = 200K, Pivot-
Basic and Pivot-Enhanced are able to achieve about 37.5x
and 1.8x speedup over SPDZ-DT.
9. FURTHER PROTECTIONS
This section extends Pivot to account for malicious adver-
saries (in Section 9.1), and to incorporate differential privacy
for enhanced protection (in Section 9.2).
9.1 Extension to Malicious Model
We demonstrate how to extend Pivot to account for ma-
licious adversaries. Recall that we assumed a semi-honest
adversary in Pivot, which means the clients do the execu-
tions correctly. In the malicious model, an adversary may
deviate from the specified protocol to infer the private data.
For example, in Algorithm 2, if u1 only adds its own en-
crypted share [r1] to compute [e] (line 4), then it can infer
the private data x after the threshold decryption. To pre-
vent such malicious behaviors, we let each client prove that
it executes the specified protocol on the correct data (i.e.,
the data a client promises to use) step by step. Once a client
deviates from the protocol or uses incorrect data in any step,
the other clients will detect it and abort the execution.
For this purpose, we extend Pivot using zero-knowledge
proofs (ZKP) [24, 26] and authenticated shares in SPDZ
[28, 46], inspired by [81]. We first present some building
blocks in Section 9.1.1, then we introduce the extension to
the basic protocol and the enhanced protocol in Section 9.1.2
and Section 9.1.3, respectively.
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Figure 5: Comparison with baselines
9.1.1 Building Blocks
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP). We use ZKP [24, 11, 26,
81] to ensure that each client performs the local computation
correctly, even if up to m − 1 clients collude maliciously.
Generally, ZKP enables a prover to prove to a verifier that
a certain statement is true, without conveying any secret
information for the statement. We mainly use the following
existing building blocks of Σ-protocol for ZKP.● Proof of plaintext knowledge (POPK): it takes a cipher-
text [a] as input and proves that the prover knows the
plaintext a∗ such that a∗ = Dec([a]) [24].● Proof of plaintext-ciphertext multiplication (POPCM):
it takes three ciphertexts [a], [b], [c] as input and proves
that the prover knows the plaintext a∗ such that a∗ =
Dec([a]) and Dec([c]) = Dec([a]) ⋅Dec([b]) [24].● Proof of homomorphic dot product (POHDP): it takes
two ciphertext vectors [a], [b] and a ciphertext [c] as
inputs and proves that the prover knows the plaintext
vector a∗ such that a∗ = Dec([a]) and Dec([c]) =
Dec([a])⊙Dec([b]) [81].
Note that the interactive Σ-protocol with honest verifier can
be transformed into efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge
(with random oracle assumption) and full zero-knowledge
using existing techniques [31, 37, 81].
SPDZ authenticated shares. SPDZ can ensure mali-
cious security even up to m − 1 clients may deviate arbi-
trarily from the protocol using the information-theoretic
message authentication code (MAC) [28, 46]. The secure
computation building blocks described in Section 2.2 are
supported accordingly. In SPDZ, given a value a ∈ Zq, its
authenticated secretly shared value is represented by ⟨a⟩ =(⟨a⟩1,⋯, ⟨a⟩m, ⟨δ⟩1,⋯, ⟨δ⟩m, ⟨∆⟩1,⋯, ⟨∆⟩m), such that client
i holds the random share ⟨a⟩i, the random MAC share ⟨δ⟩i
and the fixed MAC key share ⟨∆⟩i, and the MAC relation
δ = a⋅∆ holds. The MAC-related shares ensure that no client
can modify ⟨a⟩i without being detected. When reconstruct-
ing a secretly shared value ⟨a⟩, every client i ∈ {1,⋯,m} first
broadcast their shares ⟨a⟩i and compute a = ∑mi=1 ⟨a⟩i. To
ensure that a is correct, every client then checks the MAC
by computing and opening ⟨δ⟩i−a ⋅⟨∆⟩i, then checking these
shares sum up to zero. If the MAC is incorrect, then the
malicious behavior can be detected.
Modified MPC conversion. Since Pivot applies a hy-
brid framework of TPHE and MPC, we need to modify Al-
gorithm 1 as follows to make the MPC conversion process
satisfy malicious security [24]. Specifically, we further let
each client i: (i) broadcast [ri] together with POPK (line
3), ensuring that client i knows ri; (ii) compute [e] and call
threshold decryption (line 4), ensuring that every client have
computed the same e; and (iii) broadcast [xi] together with
POPK (lines 6-8) for committing its own share. Then, the
verifier can easily compute [e−r1] (if i = 1) or [−ri] (if i ≠ 1)
using homomorphic properties (since both [e] and [ri] are
known to all), and check if it matches [xi] using a secure
equality protocol under malicious model (e.g., [45]).
9.1.2 Basic Protocol Extension
We first discuss the extension of the classification tree
training (Section 4.1) and then the model prediction (Sec-
tion 4.3) of the basic protocol. The extension to the regres-
sion tree training follows the same way.
Classification tree training. Before training, each client
commits its local training data by encrypting and broad-
casting it to other clients, which will be used for ZKP veri-
fication during the whole training process. The committed
data includes the pre-computed split indicator vectors vl
and vr for each local split, and the label indicator vector
βk of each class k ∈ K that is only committed by the super
client. Each client uses POPK to prove that it knows the
plaintext of the committed data (e.g., [vl], [vr], [βk]). Be-
sides, the super client initializes an encrypted mask vector[α] with [1] and broadcasts it. It can be easily verified by
threshold decryption since the initial α is public.
Local computation. In this step, the super client first com-
putes and broadcasts a set of encrypted indicator vectors[L] = ⋃k∈K{[γk]} by element-wise homomorphic multipli-
cation on βk using [α] for k ∈ K. Note that [βk] has been
committed by the super client and [α] is also known to all,
the super client can use POPCM to prove that she executes
the homomorphic multiplication correctly. After that, each
client computes 2c+2 encrypted statistics for each local split,
where the only operation is the homomorphic dot product
computation, e.g., [nl] = vl ⊙ [z]. Therefore, each client
can broadcast these encrypted statistics and prove that she
performs these computations correctly using POHDP.
MPC computation. After utilizing the modified MPC con-
version algorithm, the clients obtain random shares for the
encrypted statistics. To ensure that the random shares are
not modified before combining with the MAC shares and
computing with SPDZ, the clients also need to verify that
these shares (along with the MAC shares) are valid and in-
deed match with the converted encrypted values [81]. The
rest of SPDZ computations are malicious secure as the au-
thenticated secret sharing scheme is malicious secure, and
the best split identifier ⟨i∗⟩, ⟨j∗⟩, ⟨s∗⟩ can be found and re-
vealed to all clients.
Model update. In this step, client i∗ first selects the cor-
responding split indicator vectors vl and vr of the s
∗-th
split of the j∗-th feature, and computes [αl] and [αr] by
element-wise homomorphic multiplication using [α], which
can be proved by POPCM. Note that the other clients can
select the corresponding [vl] and [vr] for the verification
given the best split identifier, as they have been committed
beforehand.
Similarly, the pruning condition check and leaf label com-
putation can be proved. For example, if any pruning con-
dition is satisfied, the super client can first compute and
broadcast the encrypted number of samples for each class k
(say [gk]) by summing up all elements in [γk], where k ∈K.
Note that the verifier can execute the same computations
(since [γk] is known to all) and use the secure equality pro-
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tocol (e.g., [45]) to verify the correctness. Then the clients
convert them into shares, i.e., ⟨gk⟩, and find the leaf label⟨k⟩ that has the maximum ⟨gk⟩ using the secure maximum
operation (see Section 4.1). The correctness can be ensured
by the modified MPC conversion algorithm and the MAC-
based SPDZ scheme. Finally, the leaf label can be revealed.
The above constructions guarantee that each client cor-
rectly follows the specified training protocol and uses the
same data (i.e., split indicator vectors, and label indicator
vectors, as committed before training) during the whole pro-
cess. If the verification of any computation is incorrect, the
execution will be aborted.
Model prediction. To ensure malicious security in the
model prediction process, each client also needs to prove that
she executes the specified computations using the correct
data. Similar to the model training stage, each client can
commit her data by encrypting and broadcasting the indi-
cator of each sample’s value comparing to the corresponding
split threshold in the tree model. For example, the clients
can commit their testing data for prediction along with the
training data using the split indicator vectors; then a veri-
fier can retrieve the other clients’ committed indicators (for
both left branch and right branch) given the sample index,
client index, feature index and split index.
As described in Algorithm 4, the clients execute the pre-
diction process in a round-robin manner. At first, client m
initializes an encrypted prediction vector [η] = ([1],⋯, [1])
with size t+1 and broadcasts it to the other clients, where t
is the number of internal nodes. The clients can jointly de-
crypt [η] to check the correctness since the elements in this
vector are known to all at the beginning. Then client m up-
dates [η] using her local sample indicators. For example, in
Figure 3, there is one feature in the tree model that belongs
to u3, and the indicators are 0 (for the left branch) and 1
(for the right branch). For any tree node in the model, the
client updates the corresponding leaf indexes in [η] using
the indicators. For example, u3 updates the first and fourth
elements by homomorphic multiplication using 0 while the
second and fifth elements by homomorphic multiplication
using 1. For any update, the client broadcasts the updated[η] together with POPCM such that the other clients can
verify the correctness. After [η] is updated by the last client
(i.e., u1 in Algorithm 4), each client can homomorphicly ag-
gregate [η] and call threshold decryption to check if the sum
is 1, ensuring that there is only one valid prediction path.
Consequently, each client computes the homomorphic dot
product operation between [η] and the leaf label vector z
and calls threshold decryption to get the prediction output.
9.1.3 Enhanced Protocol Extension
Model training. The commitment and the local compu-
tation step are exactly the same as those of the basic pro-
tocol. In the MPC computation step, instead of revealing⟨s∗⟩, the clients compute a secretly shared indicator vec-
tor ⟨λ⟩ = (⟨λ1⟩,⋯, ⟨λn′⟩) using SPDZ, where λt = 1 when
t = s∗ and λt = 0 otherwise. This step is malicious secure
since SPDZ is malicious secure. Then, for each value in ⟨λ⟩,
the clients convert it into an encrypted value, by encrypting
and broadcasting each share, and homomorphicly aggregat-
ing them together. The clients also need to verify that each
encrypted value indeed match with the converted secretly
shared value [81].
Algorithm 5: Randomly sample a secretly shared
value from Laplace distribution
Input: µ: location parameter, b: scale parameter,
Output: ⟨X⟩: secretly shared value
1 ⟨U⟩ ← sample a uniformly random secretly shared value
within (− 1
2
, 1
2
) using SPDZ
2 initialize secretly shared values ⟨Us⟩ and ⟨Ua⟩
3 if ⟨U⟩ > ⟨0⟩ then
4 ⟨Us⟩ = ⟨1⟩, ⟨Ua⟩ = ⟨U⟩
5 else if ⟨U⟩ = ⟨0⟩ then
6 ⟨Us⟩ = ⟨0⟩, ⟨Ua⟩ = ⟨0⟩
7 else
8 ⟨Us⟩ = ⟨−1⟩, ⟨Ua⟩ = ⟨−U⟩
9 ⟨X⟩ = µ − b ⋅ ⟨Us⟩ ⋅ ln(1 − 2 ⋅ ⟨Ua⟩) // compute using SPDZ
10 return ⟨X⟩
In the model update step, client i∗ first computes a pri-
vate split selection operation using [λ] and V n×n′ , where V
is the split indicator matrix for all the splits of the j∗ fea-
ture and has been committed before training. The private
split selection actually executes n homomorphic dot prod-
uct operations, which can be proved using POHDP. After
that, client i∗ executes an element-wise ciphertext multipli-
cation between the selected encrypted split indicator vector[v] and the encrypted mask vector [α] (see Section 5.2).
The correctness can be ensured by the modified MPC con-
version algorithm, the homomorphic multiplication together
with POPCM, and the conversion from secretly shared value
to ciphertext (as discussed above).
Similarly, after obtaining the secretly shared leaf label, the
clients can jointly convert it into ciphertext, instead of re-
vealing it. Therefore, the model training satisfies malicious
security.
Model prediction. Recall that in the enhanced protocol,
the clients first convert the tree model (with an encrypted
split threshold on each internal node and encrypted leaf label
on each leaf node) into secretly shared tree model, as well as
convert their input feature values into secretly shared form.
The conversion can be performed by the modified MPC con-
version algorithm together with additional verification of the
SPDZ authenticated shares (as discussed in Section 9.1.1).
After that, the rest of the computations can be executed us-
ing malicious secure SPDZ, and the prediction output can
be obtained.
9.2 Incorporating Differential Privacy
We can incorporate differential privacy (DP) [30, 42, 66,
22, 72, 41] to provide further protection, ensuring that the
released model (even in the plaintext form) leaks limited
information about individual’s private data in the training
dataset. In a nutshell, a computation is differentially private
if the probability of producing a given output does not de-
pend very much on whether a particular sample is included
in the input dataset [30, 66]. Formally, for any two datasets
D and D′ differing in a single sample and any output O of
a function f ,
Pr[f(D) ∈ O] ≤ e ⋅Pr[f(D′) ∈ O] (11)
The parameter  is the differential privacy budget that con-
trols the tradeoff between the accuracy of f and how much
information it discloses.
In our case, f trains a CART tree model with multiple
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iterations where a tree node is built in each iteration. In the
centralized DP (CDP) setting, a typical method for training
a differentially private CART tree model is to make three
queries satisfy DP in each iteration [33, 32]: (i) pruning con-
dition query (check if the number of samples n¯ on a tree node
is less than a threshold); (ii) non-leaf query (determine the
best split as a whole query); and (iii) leaf query (compute
the leaf label). Moreover, recall that in Pivot, no intermedi-
ate information is disclosed other than the tree model (i.e.,
each tree node) to be released. As a result, the executions of
Pivot essentially mimic the CDP setting in a way similar to
[22]. Therefore, we can incorporate the above CDP method
into Pivot to make the training differentially private. We
briefly introduce the classification tree case as follows (the
extension to the regression tree is similar).
We assign a DP budget  to each query. First, the clients
can compute [n¯] by homomorphicly aggregating [α] and
convert it to secretly shared ⟨n¯⟩. Before checking the condi-
tion, the clients jointly add a secretly shared random noise⟨Lap(∆/)⟩ to ⟨n¯⟩ according to the Laplace mechanism [30],
where ∆ is the sensitivity of the query, denoting the largest
possible difference that one sample can have on the output
of the query. Here ∆ = 1 since the count query can affect
the output by maximum 1. Note that the random noise can
be easily generated in an MPC way since the required prim-
itives are all supported in SPDZ, such that no client knows
the plaintext noise. Algorithm 5 describes how to sample a
secretly shared value from Laplace distribution using SPDZ.
There are two steps: (i) uniformly samples a secretly shared
value ⟨U⟩ within (− 1
2
, 1
2
) (line 1), the primitive is also sup-
ported in SPDZ [4, 28]; and (ii) computes the secretly shared
value ⟨X⟩ = µ − b ⋅ sgn(⟨U⟩) ln(1 − 2 ⋅ ∣⟨U⟩∣) (line 2-9), where
µ and b are the location parameter and scale parameter of
the Laplace distribution. According to the inverse trans-
form sampling [29, 70, 2], the result ⟨X⟩ follows the Laplace
distribution with parameters µ and b. In our case, µ = 0 and
b = ∆

. Consequently, the clients obtain the desired secretly
shared random noise to be added on ⟨n¯⟩, and no one learns
the plaintext noise.
Second, if the condition is not satisfied, the clients com-
pute the best split as described in Section 4.1, then the
clients can jointly use the exponential mechanism [30] to
choose the best split where the sensitivity of the Gini impu-
rity gain is ∆ = 2 [33]. Algorithm 6 describes the random
selection using SPDZ based on the exponential mechanism,
where the inputs are a number of R secretly shared scores,
the differential privacy budget, and the sensitivity of the
score function. The clients first compute the secretly shared
probabilities according to the exponential mechanism (line
1-2). Next, the clients normalize these probabilities such
that the sum is ⟨1⟩; meanwhile, the clients compute the
secretly shared cumulative probability for each index (line
3-7), which will be used for randomly sampling from discrete
distribution (as what does in the exponential mechanism).
After that, the clients arrange R sub-intervals within (0,1)
according to the cumulative probabilities (line 7). Then they
uniformly sample a secretly shared value ⟨U⟩ within (0,1)
(line 8), and find the sub-interval that ⟨U⟩ falls into (lines
9-14). The secretly shared index of the sub-interval follows
the discrete distribution computed above [40, 29], which sat-
isfies the exponential mechanism. Importantly, all the com-
putations are executed in an MPC way using SPDZ, such
that the clients learn nothing. In our case, in particular,
Algorithm 6: Randomly select a secretly shared index
using exponential mechanism
Input: {⟨score1⟩,⋯, ⟨scoreR⟩}: secretly shared scores
: differential privacy budget
∆: score function sensitivity
Output: ⟨index⟩: secretly shared index
1 for r ∈ [1,R] do
2 ⟨probr⟩ = exp ( ⋅⟨scorer⟩2∆ ) // compute secretly shared
probability for each score
3 ⟨P⟩ = ∑Rr=1⟨probr⟩
4 ⟨F0⟩ = ⟨0⟩
5 for r ∈ [1,R] do
6 ⟨prob′r⟩ = ⟨probr⟩⟨P ⟩ // normalize the secretly shared
probabilities such that their sum is ⟨1⟩⟨Fr⟩ = ⟨Fr−1⟩ + ⟨prob′r⟩ // cumulative probability for
scores {1,⋯, r}
7 (⟨0⟩, ⟨F1⟩), (⟨F1⟩, ⟨F2⟩),⋯, (⟨FR−1⟩, ⟨1⟩) ← arrange R
secretly shared sub-intervals within (⟨0⟩, ⟨1⟩)
8 ⟨U⟩ ← sample a uniformly random secretly shared value
within (0,1) using SPDZ
9 ⟨index⟩ = ⟨−1⟩
10 for r ∈ [1,R] do
11 if ⟨U⟩ > ⟨Fr−1⟩ ∧ ⟨U⟩ ≤ ⟨Fr⟩ then
12 ⟨index⟩ = ⟨r⟩
13 else
14 ⟨index⟩ = ⟨index⟩
15 return ⟨index⟩
after computing the impurity gain for all possible splits, the
clients obtain a set of secretly shared impurity gains, which
can be viewed as scores of the splits. The clients can use
Algorithm 6 to decide the best split while satisfying DP.
Third, if the condition is satisfied, the clients compute
the encrypted number of samples for each class k ∈ K, con-
vert them into secretly shared values, and add Laplace noise⟨Lap(∆/)⟩ to each value using Algorithm 5 before comput-
ing the leaf label, where ∆ = 1. Since each class contains
disjoint samples, the noise adding can be composed in par-
allel [30]. Notice that the budgets of queries on different
tree nodes on the same depth do not accumulate, as they
are carried out on disjoint samples [33]. Besides, each tree
node consumes 2 budget since the pruning condition query
is indispensable. As a result, the training satisfies B-DP,
where B = 2(h+ 1) and h is the maximum tree depth [33].
Similar to [22], the DP guarantee is under computational
differential privacy [56], as the adversary in the MPC set-
ting is assumed to be computationally bounded.
The integration of DP with the enhanced protocol is the
same as the basic protocol since the two additional compu-
tations are independent of the DP operations. Meanwhile, it
has an additive protection effect when integrating DP with
the enhanced protocol, because an adversary needs to re-
verse the concealed model first before obtaining the differen-
tially private model. A noteworthy aspect is that, since both
the Laplace noise generation (Algorithm 5) and the random
selection using exponential mechanism (Algorithm 6) are
computed using SPDZ, we can easily incorporate DP into
the malicious model (see Section 9.1) by replacing the semi-
honest SPDZ scheme with the authenticated SPDZ scheme.
10. RELATED WORK
The works most related to ours are [71, 67, 68, 69, 21,
50, 44] for privacy preserving vertical tree models. None of
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these solutions, however, achieve the same privacy guaran-
tee as our solution. [71, 44] assume that the super client’s
labels can be directly shared in plaintext with other clients,
which obviously violates the privacy regulations. [67, 68,
69, 21, 50] allow that some intermediate information dur-
ing the training or prediction process can be revealed in
plaintext, which compromises the client’s data privacy. For
example, all these solutions assume that the available sam-
ple ids on a tree node is public, from which any adversarial
client can easily infer that those samples belong to the same
class (given a leaf node) or have similar feature values (given
any node except the root node) with regards to the split fea-
ture on its parent node, with high probability. Also, [21, 50]
allow the split statistics for determining the best split to be
revealed in plaintext to the super client, which discloses the
client’s data distribution.
Meanwhile, although several general techniques may be
applicable to our problem, they suffer from either privacy
deficiency or inefficiency. Secure hardware (e.g., Intel SGX
[51]) protects client’s private data using secure enclaves [60,
80]. However, it relies on the assumption of a trusted third
party (e.g., Intel Corporation) and is vulnerable to side
channel attacks [76], which is not acceptable to many orga-
nizations. While secure multiparty computation (MPC) [78]
could provide a strong privacy guarantee, training machine
learning models using generic MPC frameworks is extremely
inefficient [81]. Some other tailored MPC solutions (e.g., [57,
59]) that propose to outsource client’s data to non-colluding
servers are unrealistic in practice since it is difficult to find
those qualified servers convincing the clients. Our solution
falls into the tailored MPC technique and does not rely on
any external party, achieving accuracy comparable to the
non-private solutions. [81] also uses a hybrid framework of
TPHE and MPC, but it mainly focuses on linear models
in horizontal FL, while our work addresses tree-based mod-
els in vertical FL and further considers the privacy leakages
after releasing the model.
Finally, there are a number of works on collaborative pre-
diction [23, 10, 39, 49] that consists of two parties, one is
the server holds the private model and the other is the client
holds private data. After prediction, nothing more than the
predicted output is revealed to both parties. However, these
solutions cannot be directly adopted in our problem. Since
every client knows (a share of) the tree model and holds a
subset of feature values in our setting. Although [21, 50]
consider the same vertical FL scenario as ours, their meth-
ods disclose the prediction path (see Section 4.3) and thus
leak client’s data privacy along that path. In contrast, our
solution guarantees that no intermediate information other
than the final prediction output is revealed.
11. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed Pivot, a privacy preserving solution
with two protocols for vertical tree-based models. With
the basic protocol, Pivot guarantees that no intermediate
information is disclosed during the execution. With the en-
hanced protocol, Pivot further mitigates the possible pri-
vacy leakages occurring in the basic protocol. To our best
knowledge, this is the first work that provides strong privacy
guarantees for vertical tree-based models. The experimental
results demonstrate Pivot achieves accuracy comparable to
non-private algorithms and is highly efficient.
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